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ABSTRACT
Experimental science workflows from projects such as Com-
pact Muon Solenoid (CMS) [6] and Laser Interferometer
Gravitational Wave Observatory (LIGO) [2] are character-
ized by data-intensive computational tasks over large datasets
transferred over encrypted channels. The Science DMZ [7]
approach to network design favors lossless packet forward-
ing through a separate isolated network over secure lossy
forwarding through stateful packet processors (e.g. fire-
walls). We propose ScienceSDS, a novel software defined
security framework for securely monitoring large-scale sci-
ence datasets over a software defined networking and net-
work functions virtualization (SDN/NFV) infrastructure.
CCS Concepts
•Networks → Network security; Network services;
Network monitoring;
Keywords
Software Defined Security; Data-intensive Science; Service
Function Chaining
1. INTRODUCTION
Experimental science workflows are often characterized
by data-intensive tasks over large distributed networks, re-
quiring significant computational and networking resources.
Projects such as Compact Muon Solenoid (CMS) [6] and
Laser Interferometer Gravitational Wave Observatory (LIGO)
[2] are examples of scientific experiments that require data-
intensive infrastructure. These experiments require high-
speed data transfers between endpoints, often transferring
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large data files (upto peta-byte sized files) over high-band-
width, high-latency networks. Examples of commonly used
network protocols for large-volume data transfers over high-
bandwidth, high-latency networks in cluster/grid environ-
ments include GridFTP [3] and XROOTD [8]. These proto-
cols use multiple TCP sessions to maximize the throughput
of data transfers. Multiple encrypted TCP sessions carry
data simultaneously between endpoints. High-perform-ance
computing (HPC) facilities need to have the appropriate cy-
bersecurity measures in place to respond to security threats
[9]; data-intensive science further increases the complexities
of the associated security systems due to the large volume
of data transferred between endpoints.
Security functions such as firewalls, deep packet inspection
(DPI) units etc., are necessary to securely monitor/inspect
the ingress traffic for potential threats. Although firewalls
provide a transparent path for legitimate traffic, they are
subject to scalability and performance constraints when used
with fast transfers of large datasets from experimental sci-
ence projects [7]. Stateful firewalls processing large data
transfers introduce packet losses, thus preventing researchers
from exploiting the high-bandwidth, high-latency network
links. Further, with protocols such as GridFTP or XROOTD
employing encrypted channels to transfer data, additional
packet inspection may be necessary to classify a packet.
Thus, attempting high-throughput transfers through such
stateful network functions leads to network performance deg-
radation.
In this work, we propose ScienceSDS, a novel software
defined security framework for large-scale data intensive sci-
ence over a SDN/NFV architecture. Unlike traditional state-
ful packet processors that subject all incoming traffic to pro-
cessing, our framework exploits application-layer and network-
layer collaboration to optimize and enable selective packet
processing. Further, our framework enables the flexible com-
position of different security services using service function
chaining (SFC). SFC is the ability to define an ordered list of
network services (e.g. firewalls, accelerators, load balancers
etc), which are then “stitched” together to create a service
chain. The proposed framework facilitates complex security
services creation and chaining for SDN managed experimen-
tal science data transfers. Incoming datasets that do not un-
dergo any security checks due to the large volume of trans-
fers between endpoints will be selectively routed through the
SFC for monitoring and/or inspection. This guarantees se-
cure data transfers between endpoints, while ensuring that
the security services are dynamically composable and can be
suitably adapted to changing traffic requirements.
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The paper is structured as follows: Sections 2 presents the
background and introduces important concepts such as Sci-
ence DMZ architecture and service function chaining; Sec-
tion 3 discusses the related work and provides the context for
Science DMZ security; Section 4 presents the ScienceSDS, a
security framework for data-intensive science and the traffic
classification mechanisms using SNAG; Section 3 describes
the SNAG approach to monitoring data flows; Section 4 de-
scribes the implemented architecture; Section 5 discusses the
results from ScienceSDS and Sections 6 and 7 presents the
conclusions and the future work.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Data-intensive Science
A Science DMZ [7] (de-militarized zone) architecture was
proposed by ESNet. It is a structured network design which
introduces a fast subnet at the network edge of each orga-
nization (e.g. university campuses, research labs etc), but
without the associated performance limits generally arising
from stateful packet processors. An example Science DMZ
network design is illustrated in Figure 1. Two traffic paths
are shown, with the Science DMZ traffic bypassing the cam-
pus network security measures such as a firewall. Thus,
Science DMZ is designed to handle high-volume traffic typi-
cal of data-intensive science projects with optimizations for
a moderate number of high-speed flows, and is typically de-
ployed at the perimeter of the local network.
Figure 1: ScienceDMZ network architecture
The network design combines host security with router
interface access control lists in a simple scalable fashion to
protect the computing resources from intruders. The pri-
mary components of a Science DMZ architecture include:
(i) Data Transfer Node (DTN) running parallel data trans-
fer protocols such as GridFTP, (ii) perfSONAR for network
performance monitoring, and (iii) high-performance routers
and switches. Although a Science DMZ arguably provides
adequate protection against intruders and attacks, it is not
without its problems. Since it requires networks that are free
from packet loss and middleboxes such as traffic shapers or
stateful firewalls that reduce network performance, traffic
monitoring/inspection is performed selectively thereby re-
ducing the ability to detect attacks and intrusions. This
reduces accountability for an institution and therefore ne-
cessitates additional cybersecurity measures for secure mon-
itoring and transfer of data.
2.2 Virtualized Network Services
Recent advances in network functions virtualization (NFV)
[13] and software defined networking (SDN) [20] allows agility
and programmability in service-oriented networking. Ser-
vice (or Network) functions can now be developed to address
the need for effective provisioning and deployment, resulting
in faster deployment cycles for new and innovative network
services. Specialized service/network functions that were
deployed as middleboxes (e.g. firewalls, IDS, NAT etc.) can
now be defined as independent virtual network functions
(VNFs). These VNFs can be logically chained together to
form service chains (SCs) that represent a complete service
overlay network (SON). Services can now be independently
and programmatically composed for both well-established
operations and new innovative user services. However un-
like traditional service/network functions, virtualized ser-
vice functions provide greater flexibility in management and
composition while ensuring better scalability at a lower cap-
ital and operations expenditure (CAPEX/OPEX).
2.3 Service Function Chaining
Connected end-to-end network services can be construed
as a set of independent service functions such as firewalls, in-
trusion detection systems (IDS), network address translator
(NAT) boxes, or other application-specific functions. These
service (or network) functions provide some value-added ser-
vices to the traffic flows in the network.
Service function chaining (SFC) is the definition, instan-
tiation and deployment of an ordered set of service (or net-
work) functions to build a composite service, and the sub-
sequent routing of traffic through this ordered set [10]. SFC
can be employed to override the default destination forward-
ing mechanism typically used in IP networks. Unlike net-
work functions in traditional networks, where services are
provided by a set of connected physical devices, SFC uti-
lizes VNFs through a NFV architecture to provide a vir-
tual environment for provisioning services. Therefore, SFC
provides the ability to route flows through network paths
other than the ones specified in the packet’s destination
routing table. For example, a service chain can force all
traffic through a service function such as an IDS, even if
the IDS may not be on the data-path between the source-
destination pair. The ordering of multiple such (virtual)
service functions can create a complex service chain, inte-
grating different services into a logically-composable set of
end-to-end functions. Each SFC consists of an ordered se-
quence of service (or network) functions, with each service
function performing a specific task that aids in processing
traffic between a given source-destination pair.
Figure 2: Example SFC Domain
An example SFC domain is shown in Figure 2. Each SFC
domain consists of a service classifier and the actual service
function path. One or more service function paths can exist
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(a) High-level Overview (b) Framework Components
Figure 3: A software defined security framework for data-intensive science.
in a typical setup, and each path represents a SFC composed
of a set of service functions.
Flow classification mechanisms are necessary to route the
flows to specific service chains. The flow classifier is a logi-
cal entity that can be used to reclassify traffic at any point
on the service chain. Traffic classification is achieved by in-
serting SFC-specific headers such as service chain headers
[21] or network service headers [18], to the packets/frames
of the traffic flows. These headers serve as identifiers that
facilitate packet forwarding along the service function chain.
The following section outlines the open problems associated
with service deployments in existing networks.
3. RELATED WORK
The Next Generation Service Overlay Network (NGSON)
[1] project is an IEEE sponsored effort to standardize an
open service ecosystem, where diverse service providers col-
laborate to satisfy user requirements through service compo-
sition and delivery across heterogeneous provider networks.
The framework organizes application services offered by var-
ious networks into logically separate service- and transport-
related functions over an overlay network. NGSON can be
used to offer services that are context-aware and tightly in-
tegrated [12]. However, divergent views on network/service
provisioning make the adoption of such a framework non-
trivial. Although, benefits of faster roll-outs of network ser-
vices exist, the lack of flexibility in network management
and interoperability concerns result in slow and expensive
changes to the network. Specialized security service func-
tions are currently provided using highly specialized middle-
boxes resulting in unwieldy static chains of network/service
appliances without specific consideration for end-point re-
quirements [15]. Our proposed framework uses a combined
SDN/NFV approach to address the above problems while
deploying security service functions over an existing net-
work.
While SDN capabilities can be used to setup data-paths
for traffic to traverse specific service chains, different data
processing requirements can be handled by routing traffic
through dynamically established service chains. The work
in [14] presents a service-oriented SDN controller that allows
provisioning programmable data-paths through a set of dy-
namically created virtual service sequences. However, the
network use is sub-optimal as the traffic traverses through a
general set of middleboxes, and the context-awareness is lim-
ited to a common set of service classes with no large-scale
evaluations. Other work include service specific instances
that use proactive and application-driven network configura-
tions [11], where a session- based model installs flow entries
proactively based on network services before connecting to
SDNs. The work in [17] proposes the use of SDN to improve
the management of middleboxes while limiting the number
of flow entries of the switches. [22] also leverages SDN and
OpenFlow architecture to propose a scalable framework for
dynamically routing of traffic through any sequence of mid-
dleboxes based on the use of multiple tables and metadata.
However, both proposals do not address a comprehensive
design of service chaining within the framework of service
overlay networks while incorporating the dynamic definition
of chains and the context-aware delivery of application ser-
vice data. NFShunt [16] presents an extension to the Science
DMZ design to use a firewall that combines Linux netfilter
and OpenFlow switching. NFShunt allows selective bypass-
switching policy and expresses it as an iptables firewall rule-
set. Unlike [16], our framework selectively filters trusted
flows through application- and network-layer collaboration
and therefore only reroutes non-science traffic.
4. SECURITY FRAMEWORK
ScienceSDS shown in Figure 3 for data-intensive science
relies on accurate and reliable classification of science datasets
for selective classification and rerouting of flows to a virtu-
alized security services infrastructure. Traditional networks
use specialized security functions (or middleboxes) that are
physical devices modeled as a transparent ‘bumps-in-the-
wire’. Multiple middleboxes can exist in the data transfer
path creating a service infrastructure that is both unwieldy
and that have a ‘strict’ ordering of functionality.
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To solve the problems associated with static service chain-
ing in traditional networks that use a ‘strict’ ordering of net-
work resources, the security services in our framework are
modeled as virtual network functions (VNFs). The VNF
lifecycle management is handled by a cloud-based NFV sys-
tem1. This provides greater flexibility in the creation, mod-
ification, placement and deletion of the network services dy-
namically to suit traffic requirements. These VNFs are then
combined together to form service function chains (SFCs).
This system is now used to provide security functions to
enable software-defined security for securely managing and
monitoring incoming traffic. SDN control using ONOS2 is
employed to reroute the classified traffic to traverse appro-
priate service chains by programming the ingress OpenFlow
switches. Thus our framework adopts a security-as-a-service
approach to network security, where independent security
service functions can be ‘chained’ together to form an inte-
grated network security service.
4.1 Traffic Classification using SNAG
GridFTP transfers create multiple parallel connections to
maximize TCP throughput during data transfers. Since the
TCP streams are encrypted, the classification of data trans-
fers is dependent on authenticated user information and des-
tination data storage server locations, both of which are ap-
plication layer data. Due to the encrypted nature of the
data transfer streams, traditional approaches to networking
monitoring/classification fail, requiring deep packet inspec-
tion and other security implements.
Our SDN-managed Network Architecture for GridFTP
transfers (SNAG) proposed in [4], and shown in Figure 4,
enables the transfer of GridFTP files using SDN-based net-
work management. It focuses on exposing an Application
Program Interface (API) to obtain the application-layer in-
formation from the trusted GridFTP process. The GridFTP
server is extended to interact securely with the SDN con-
troller and automatically forwards application layer meta-
data, including source/destination address/port pairs, ses-
sion and file transfer information. This information is ex-
ploited by the network layer, allowing it to accurately track
all currently active flows using the application metadata.
However, SNAG is only responsible for traffic classification
and monitoring of CMS traffic, and therefore does not pro-
vide any security services for traffic handling.
Figure 4: SNAG Components [4]
4.2 Virtualized Security Infrastructure
Service function chains (SFCs) contain independent secu-
rity functions (i.e. VNFs) such as firewalls, DPI units and
IDS boxes etc. We use SDN control of both the ingress
1http://www.openstack.org
2http://onosproject.org
OpenFlow switches (See §4.3), as well as the Open vSwitch3
(OVS) instances created by the NFV infrastructure for rout-
ing traffic to different service functions. In this work, we
use the Open Network Operating System (ONOS) [5] SDN
framework to intelligently steer traffic to the appropriate ser-
vice functions based on the traffic classification information
obtained from SNAG.
In order to manage different virtualized service functions
(i.e. VNFs in this case), we use OpenStack [19], an open
source cloud computing platform. OpenStack provides the
ability to create and manage different service functions. We
use an ONOS Virtual Tenant Network (VTN) application
to interface to the OpenStack system. OpenStack provides
RESTful APIs that can be used to communicate SFC in-
formation to the SDN controller. The interaction is en-
abled using two OpenStack plugins: networking-sfc4 and
networking-onos5.
4.3 Network Topology
Our framework is setup to work with a U.S. CMS Tier-2
site capable of handling high-volume transfers to Fermilab.
The site stores approximately 2PB of data from projects
such as CMS and LIGO, and uses GridFTP protocol for
bulk batch transfer jobs and the XROOTD for interactive
jobs. The network topology at Holland Computing Cen-
ter6 (HCC) is as shown in Figure 5. A Brocade MLXe is
used as the data center’s border router connecting to the
WAN at 100Gbps. Two OpenFlow capable switches, a Dell
S6000 40GbE switch, and an Edge-Core AS4600-54T switch
connect to the border router as shown in the figure. The
first switch hosts the production GridFTP and XROOTd
servers, while the second hosts a testbed environment with
a GridFTP server removed from the production pool for
testing purposes.
The framework is deployed on the testbed environment
through the HCC’s internal cloud. The components inte-
grated into the framework include:
• OpenStack cloud for VNF lifecycle management, Neu-
tron servers and Module Layer 2 (ML2) plugins.
• ONOS SDN controllers for intelligent flow manage-
ment and the associated ONOS SNAG application.
• Components required for interaction with the GridFTP
servers including GridFTP-HDFS (for communicating
with the storage systems), and the GridFTP-XIO call-
out module (to expose a RESTful API to the SDN
controller)
4.4 Implementation and Design
Our framework integrates SDN control with NFV to pro-
vide a unified security framework for data-intensive science.
The framework is illustrated in Figure 3. A high-level overview
of the framework is shown in Figure 3a. It can be seen that
OpenStack is used for providing VNF resources, manage-
ment and orchestration. Networking between various VNFs
is provided through OpenStack Neutron7. Neutron is used
3http://openvswitch.org/
4https://github.com/openstack/networking-sfc/
5https://github.com/openstack/networking-onos/
6http://hcc.unl.edu/
7https://github.com/openstack/neutron
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Figure 5: Network Topology
for managing the internal virtual networks within Open-
Stack and interfaces with the ONOS SDN controller using
an ONOS Plugin. The ONOS SDN controller is responsi-
ble for configuring the data paths traversed by the science
datasets, and through its integration with the SNAG sys-
tem provides accurate information about all current ongoing
GridFTP transfers.
Figure 3b shows the interaction between the NFV infras-
tructure, SDN control and the GridFTP servers. The Neu-
tron server provides a plugin architecture for enabling the
OpenStack to interact with different layer 2 technologies
through the ML2 agent service. ONOS plugs-in to the neu-
tron ML2 agent via a driver that provides an interface to the
external ONOS controller through the ONOS Virtual Ten-
ant Network (VTN) application. The SDN controller can
now interface with the NFV infrastructure to obtain infor-
mation about all available service chains and flow classifiers.
This information is useful to steer the traffic to appropriate
service chains for stateful packet processing. On the other
side, the SDN controller interfaces to the ONOS SNAG ap-
plication and uses the traffic classification information to
selectively reroute non-science traffic to the determined se-
curity service for monitoring and inspection.
5. EXPERIMENTS
5.1 Setup
ScienceSDS was tested in the project testbed shown in
Figure 5. The testbed hosts three servers namely i) An
OpenStack server to provide the NFV infrastructure and
provides a platform for hosting the security service func-
tions, ii) An ONOS SDN controller responsible for inter-
facing to both the NVF infrastructure and the traffic clas-
sification systems, and iii) A server hosting SNAG compo-
nents to expose application-layer metadata from the testbed
GridFTP server. Multiple service chains were created with
the corresponding service functions (VNFs), with each chain
steering traffic from one to six service functions. Every
service function in the experiments host a generic Linux
iptables firewall populated with basic rules. Each VNF was
configured to create unique SFC elements per service fuc-
tion, with fully independent port pairs and port groups. Two
flow classifiers were assigned to each SFC, with the first flow
classifier used to steer TCP traffic and the second for UDP
traffic.
5.2 Results and Discussion
The objective of our experiments is to evaluate the perfor-
mance costs associated with the use of virtual infrastructure
for stateful packet processing. Each experiment was run 10
times with the same configuration settings. We evaluate
the performance of ScienceSDS by looking at both the time
required to setup a SFC for varying number of security ser-
vice functions in the path, and also the delay cost of steering
the traffic through SFCs of different sizes. Figure 6 shows
the service chain setup times with one to six security service
functions in the SFC path. The setup times vary between 10
and 30 seconds and increase monotonically when the num-
ber of service functions in the SFC increases. Although the
service chain setup times increase with an increasing num-
ber of service functions, this is a one-time cost and does not
affect ingress traffic unless these chains are setup very fre-
quently for different traffic flows. Figure 7 shows the delays
associated with traversing the SFC. From the graph it can
be seen that the average delays for traversing the SFC varies
between 1ms to about 5ms. Thus, traversing the SFC with
virtualized security service functions does not incur signifi-
cant packet processing delays.
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Figure 6: Performance of service chain setups.
6. CONCLUSIONS
ScienceSDS demonstrates an SDN/NFV approach to se-
curing large-scale science datasets without sacrificing man-
agement flexibility and topology independence. By com-
bining a virtualized security infrastructure with traffic clas-
sification based on application- and network-layer collab-
oration, stateful security processing can be performed on
the traffic without incurring significant performance over-
heads. Also, by subjecting incoming traffic to prior classi-
fication, security-related processing tasks can be limited to
17
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
1 2 3 4 5 6
Ti
m
e 
(S
)
#service functions
Figure 7: Response times for SFC traversals.
non-science traffic, thereby reducing the load on the secu-
rity functions. ScienceSDS also ensures flexibility in security
service composition through the use of appropriate VNFs,
thus ensuring that the security framework is responsive and
adaptable to both traffic changes and security attacks.
7. FUTURE WORK
Future work will focus on the performance of the frame-
work when heterogeneous security functions are incorpo-
rated into the SFC. Scalability studies by processing traf-
fic from a larger percentage of GridFTP servers are neces-
sary to ensure at-scale performance of the framework. We
will focus on tighter integration with other protocols such
as XROOTD, and data-plane optimizations for the virtual
infrastructure.
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